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 Abstract—   Cloud computing is the long dreamed vision of computing as a utility, where users can remotely store their data into the cloud so as to enjoy  
the on-demand high quality applications and services from a shared pool of configurable computing resources. By data outsourcing, users can be relieved  
from the burden of local data storage and maintenance. we utilize the public key based homomorphism authenticator and uniquely integrate it with random  
mask technique to achieve a privacy-preserving public auditing system for cloud data storage security while keeping all above requirements in mind. To  
support efficient handling of multiple auditing tasks, we further explore the technique of bilinear aggregate signature to extend our main result into a  
multi-user setting, where TPA can perform multiple auditing tasks simultaneously along with investigates secure outsourcing of widely applicable linear  
programming (LP) computations. In order to achieve practical efficiency, our mechanism design explicitly decomposes the LP computation outsourcing  
into public LP solvers running on the cloud and private LP parameters owned by the customer Extensive security and performance analysis shows the  
proposed schemes are provably secure and highly efficient.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud Computing has been envisioned as the next-generation architecture 
of IT enterprise, due to its long list of unprecedented advantages in the IT  
history:  on-demand  self-service,  ubiquitous  network  access,  location 
independent  resource  pooling,  rapid  resource  elasticity,  usage-based 
pricing  and  transference  of  risk  [1].  As  a  disruptive  technology  with  
profound implications, Cloud Computing is transforming the very nature 
of how businesses use information technology. One fundamental aspect 
of this paradigm shifting is that data is being centralized or outsourced 
into the Cloud. From users’ perspective, including both individuals and 
IT  enterprises,  storing  data  remotely  into  the  cloud  in  a  flexible  on-
demand manner brings appealing benefits: relief of the burden for storage 
management,  universal  data  access  with  independent  geographical 
locations, and avoidance of capital expenditure on hardware,  software,  
and personnel maintenances, etc [2]. One fundamental advantage of the 
cloud  paradigm  is  computation  outsourcing,  where  the  computational 
power  of  cloud  customers  is  no  longer  limited  by  their  resource-
constraint devices. 
By outsourcing the workloads into the cloud, customers could enjoy the 
literally unlimited computing resources in a pay-per-use manner without 
committing  any large capital  outlays  in  the purchase of  hardware  and 
software  and/or  the  operational  overhead  there  in.  Despite  the 
tremendous benefits, outsourcing computation to the commercial public 
cloud is also depriving customers’ direct control over the systems that 
consume and produce their data during the computation, which inevitably 
brings in new security concerns and challenges towards this promising 
computing  model  [3].  On  the  one  hand,  the  outsourced  computation 
workloads  often  contain  sensitive  information,  such  as  the  business 
financial  records,  proprietary research data,  or   personally identifiable 
health  information  etc.  To  combat  against  unauthorized  information 
leakage, sensitive data have to be encrypted before outsourcing [4] so as 
to  provide  end to  end data  confidentiality  assurance in  the cloud and 
beyond. However, ordinary data encryption techniques in essence prevent 
cloud  from  performing  any  meaningful  operation  of  the  Underlying 
plaintext data [5], 
Examples  include  cloud  service  providers,  for  monetary  reasons, 
reclaiming  storage  by  discarding  data  that  has  not  been  or  is  rarely 
accessed, or even hiding data loss incidents so as to maintain a 
reputation [6]. In short, although outsourcing data into the cloud is 
economically attractive for the cost and complexity of long-term 
large-scale data storage, it does not offer any guarantee on data 
integrity and availability. This problem, if not properly addressed, 
may impede the successful deployment of the cloud architecture. 
As users no longer physically possess the storage of their data, 
traditional  cryptographic  primitives  for  the  purpose  of  data 
security  protection  can  not  be  directly  adopted.  Thus,  how to 
efficiently verify the correctness of outsourced cloud data without 
the  local  copy  of  data  files  becomes  a  big  challenge  for  data  
storage  security  in  Cloud  Computing.  Note  that  simply 
downloading the data for its integrity verification is not a practical  
solution due to the expensiveness in I/O cost and transmitting the 
file across the network. 
Besides, it is often insufficient to detect the data corruption when 
accessing the data, as it might be too late for recover the data loss  
or damage. Considering the large size of the outsourced data and 
the user’s constrained resource capability, the ability to audit the 
correctness of the data in a cloud environment can be formidable  
and expensive for the cloud users [7]. Therefore, to fully ensure 
the data security and save the cloud users computation resources, 
it is of critical importance to enable public audit ability for cloud 
data storage so that the users may resort to a third party auditor 
(TPA), who has expertise and capabilities that the users do not, to 
audit the outsourced data when needed. Based on the audit result,  
TPA could release an audit  report,  which  would  not  only help 
users to evaluate the risk of their subscribed cloud data services, 
but also be beneficial  for the cloud service provider to improve 
their cloud based service platform [8]. In a word, enabling public 
risk auditing protocols will play an important role for this nascent 
cloud economy to become fully established; where users will need 
ways to assess risk and gain trust in Cloud. Recently, the notion of 
public audit ability has been proposed in the context of ensuring 
remotely stored data integrity under different systems and security 
models  [9].  Public  audit  ability  allows  an  external  party,  in 
addition to the user himself, to verify the correctness of remotely 
stored data. However, most of these schemes [10] do not support 
the privacy protection of users’ data against external auditors, i.e., they 
may  potentially  reveal  user  data  information  to  the  auditors.  This 
drawback  greatly  affects  the  security  of  these  protocols  in  Cloud 
Computing. From the perspective of protecting data privacy,  the users, 
who own the data and rely on TPA just for the storage security of their  
data, do not want this auditing process introducing new vulnerabilities of 
unauthorized  information  leakage  towards  their  data  security  [11]. 
Moreover, there are legal regulations, such as the US Health Insurance 
Portability  and  Accountability  Act  (HIPAA)  ,  further  demanding  the 
outsourced data not to be leaked to external parties [8]. Exploiting data 
encryption before outsourcing [12] is one way to mitigate  this privacy 
concern, but it is only complementary to the privacy-preserving public 
auditing  scheme  to  be  proposed  in  this  paper.  Without  a  properly 
designed auditing protocol, encryption itself can not prevent data from 
“flowing  away”  towards  external  parties  during  the  auditing  process. 
Thus, it does not completely solve the problem of protecting data privacy 
but  just  reduces  it  to  the  one  of  managing  the  encryption  keys. 
Unauthorized data leakage still remains a problem due to the potential 
exposure of encryption keys. 
Specifically, we first formulate private data owned by the customer for  
LP  problem  as  a  set  of  matrices  and  vectors.  This  higher  level 
representation allows  us to  apply a  set  of  efficient  Privacy-preserving 
problem transformation techniques, including matrix multiplication and 
affine mapping, to transform the original LP problem into some arbitrary 
one while protecting the sensitive input/output information. One crucial 
benefit  of  this  higher  level  problem  transformation  method  is  that 
existing algorithms and tools for LP solvers can be directly reused by the 
cloud server. Although the generic mechanism defined at circuit level,  
e.g. [13], can even allow the customer to hide the fact that the outsourced 
computation  is  LP,  we  believe  imposing  this  more  stringent  security 
measure than necessary would greatly affect the efficiency. To validate 
the computation result, we utilize the fact that the result is from cloud 
server solving the transformed LP problem. In particular, we explore the 
fundamental duality theorem together with the piece-wise construction of 
auxiliary  LP  problem  to  derive  a  set  of  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions that the correct Customer LP problem Φ. 
Fig. 1: Architecture of secure outsourcing linear programming problems 
in Cloud Computing
Result  must  satisfy.  Such  a  method  of  result  validation  can  be  very 
efficient and incurs close-to-zero additional overhead on both customer 
and cloud server. With correctly verified result,
Customer  can  use  the  secret  transformation  to  map  back  the  desired 
solution for his original LP problem. We summarize our contributions as 
follows:
1) For the first time, we formalize the problem of securely outsourcing 
LP computations,  and provide  such a secure and practical mechanism 
design  which  fulfills  input/output  privacy,  cheating  resilience,  and 
efficiency.
2) Our mechanism brings cloud customer great computation savings from 
secure LP outsourcing as it only incurs O(n_) for some 2 < _ ≤ 3 local 
computation overhead on the customer, while solving a normal LP 
problem usually requires more than O(n3) time [13].
3) The computations done by the cloud server  shares the same 
time complexity of currently practical algorithms for solving the 
linear programming problems, which ensures that the use of cloud 
is economically viable.
4) The experiment evaluation further demonstrates the immediate 
practicality:  our mechanism can always  help customers  achieve 
more than 30× savings when the sizes of the original LP problems 
are not too small, while introducing no substantial overhead on the 
cloud.
Therefore, how to enable a privacy-preserving third-party auditing 
protocol, independent to data encryption,  is the problem we are 
going to tackle in this paper. Our work is among the first few ones 
to  support  privacy-preserving  public  auditing  in  Cloud 
Computing,  with  a  focus  on  data  storage.  Besides,  with  the 
prevalence  of  Cloud  Computing,  a  foreseeable  increase  of 
auditing tasks from different users may be delegated to TPA. As 
the individual auditing of these growing tasks can be tedious and 
cumbersome,  a  natural  demand  is  then  how to  enable  TPA to 
efficiently perform the multiple auditing tasks in a batch manner, 
i.e., simultaneously. To address these problems, our work utilizes 
the technique of public key based homomorphism authenticator 
[14],  which  enables  TPA  to  perform  the  auditing  without 
demanding the local copy of data and thus drastically reduces the 
communication  and  computation  overhead  as  compared  to  the 
straightforward  data  auditing  approaches.  By  integrating  the 
homomorphism authenticator  with  random mask  technique,  our 
protocol  guarantees  that  TPA  could  not  learn  any  knowledge 
about  the  data  content  stored  in  the  cloud  server  during  the 
efficient auditing process.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 System and Threat Model
We  consider  a  computation  outsourcing  architecture  involving 
two different entities, as illustrated in Fig. 1: the cloud customer, 
who has large amount of computationally expensive LP problems 
to be outsourced to the cloud; the  cloud server  (CS), which has 
significant computation resources and provides utility computing 
services, such as hosting the public LP solvers in a pay-per-use 
manner.  The  customer  has  a  large-scale  linear  programming 
problem (to be formally defined later) to be solved. However, due 
to  the  lack  of  computing  resources,  like  processing  power, 
memory,  and  storage  etc.,  he  cannot  carry  out  such  expensive 
Computation locally. Thus, the customer resorts to CS for solving 
the LP computation and leverages its computation capacity in a 
pay-per-use manner. Instead of directly sending original problem, 
the customer first  uses  a secret  K to map into some encrypted  
version  K  and  outsources  problem K to  CS.  CS  then  uses  its 
public  LP  solver  to  get  the  answer  of   K  and  provides  a 
correctness proof �, but it is supposed to learn nothing or little of 
the  sensitive  information  contained  in  the  original  problem 
description. After receiving the solution of encrypted problem K, 
the  customer  should  be  able  to  first  verify  the  answer  via  the 
appended proof . If it’s correct, he then uses the secret K to map  
the output into the desired answer for the original problem.
The cloud user (U), who has large amount of data files to be stored in the 
cloud; the cloud server (CS), which is managed by cloud service provider 
(CSP) to provide data storage service and has significant storage space 
and  computation  resources  (we  will  not  differentiate  CS  and  CSP 
hereafter.);  the  third  party  auditor  (TPA),  who  has  expertise  and 
capabilities that cloud users do not have and is trusted to assess the cloud 
storage service security on behalf of the user upon request.  Users rely on 
the  CS  for  cloud  data  storage  and  maintenance.  They  may  also 
dynamically interact with the CS to access and update their stored data  
for various application purposes.
The users may resort to TPA for ensuring the storage security of their 
outsourced data, while hoping to keep their data private from TPA. We 
consider the existence of a semi-trusted CS in the sense that in most of 
time  it  behaves  properly  and  does  not  deviate  from  the  prescribed 
protocol  execution.  While  providing  the  cloud  data  storage  based 
services,  for  their  own  benefits  the  CS  might  neglect  to  keep  or 
deliberately delete rarely accessed data files  which  belong to ordinary 
cloud users. Moreover, the CS may decide to hide the data corruptions 
caused by server hacks or Byzantine failures to maintain reputation. We 
assume  the  TPA,  who  is  in  the  business  of  auditing,  is  reliable  and 
independent, and thus has no incentive to collude with either the CS or 
the users during the auditing process. TPA should be able to efficiently 
audit  the  cloud  data  storage  without  local  copy  of  data  and  without 
bringing  in  additional  on-line  burden  to  cloud  users.  However,  any 
possible  leakage  of  user’s  outsourced  data  towards  TPA through  the 
auditing protocol should be prohibited.
Note that to achieve the audit delegation and authorize CS to respond to  
TPA’s audits, the user can sign a certificate granting audit rights to the 
TPA’s public key, and all audits from the TPA are authenticated against 
such a  certificate.  These authentication handshakes are  omitted  in  the 
following presentation.
2.2 Design Goals
To enable privacy-preserving public auditing for cloud data storage under 
the  aforementioned  Model,  our  protocol  design  should  achieve  the 
following security and performance guarantee: 
1) Public audit ability: to allow TPA to verify the correctness of the cloud 
data on demand without
Fig 2: Architecture of cloud storage data service.
retrieving  a  copy of  the  whole  data  or  introducing  additional  on-line 
burden to the cloud users; 
2)  Storage  correctness:  to  ensure  that  there  exists  no  cheating  cloud 
server that can pass the audit from TPA without  indeed storing users’ 
data intact; 
3)  Privacy-preserving:  to  ensure that  there  exists  no way for  TPA to 
derive  users’  data  content  from  the  information  collected  during  the 
auditing process; 
4)  Batch  auditing:  to  enable  TPA  with  secure  and  efficient  auditing 
capability to cope with multiple auditing delegations from possibly large 
number  of  different  users  simultaneously;  5)  Lightweight:  to 
allow TPA to  perform auditing  with  minimum  communication 
and computation overhead. 
2.3 Notation and Preliminaries
The data file to be outsourced, denoted as a sequence of n blocks 
m1, . . . ,mn  ∈Zp for some large prime p.
– fkey(・) – pseudorandom function (PRF), defined as: {0, 1}  ∗ × 
key → Zp.
– _key(・) – pseudorandom permutation (PRP), defined as:  {0, 
1}log2(n) × key → {0,}log2(n).
– MACkey(.  )  –  message  authentication code (MAC) function, 
defined as: {0, 1}∗×key → {0, 1}l.
– H(・), h(・) – map-to-point hash functions, defined as: {0, 1}∗ 
→ G, where G is some group.
We now introduce some necessary cryptographic background for 
our  proposed  scheme.  Bilinear  Map  Let  G1,  G2  and  GT  be 
multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 and g2 be 
generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear map is a map e : 
G1  ×  G2  →  GT  with  the  following  properties  [15,  16]:  1) 
Computable: there exists an efficiently computable algorithm
for computing e; 2) Bilinear: for all u  ∈G1, v  ∈G2 and a, b  ∈ Zp, 
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab; 3) Non-degenerate: e(g1, g2)  6= 1; 4) for 
any u1, u2  ∈G1, v  ∈G2, e(u1u2, v) = e(u1, v)* e(u2, v).
3. PROPOSED SCHEMES
In  the  introduction  we  motivated  the  public  audit  ability  with 
achieving economies of scale for cloud computing. This section 
presents  our  public  auditing  scheme  for  cloud  data  storage 
security. We start from the overview of our public auditing system 
and discuss two straightforward schemes and their demerits. Then 
we present our main result for privacy-preserving public auditing 
to achieve the aforementioned design goals. We also show how to 
extent our main scheme to support batch auditing for TPA upon 
delegations from multi-users. Finally, we discuss how to adapt our 
main result to support data dynamics.
3.1 Definitions and Framework of Public Auditing System
We follow the similar definition of previously proposed schemes 
in  the context  of  remote  data  integrity  checking  and  adapt  the 
framework for our privacy-preserving public auditing system.
A public auditing scheme consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, 
SigGen,  GenProof,  VerifyProof).  KeyGen  is  a  key  generation 
algorithm that is run by the user to setup the scheme. SigGen is 
used  by the  user  to  generate  verification  metadata,  which  may 
consist of MAC, signatures, or other related information that will 
be  used  for  auditing.  GenProof  is  run  by  the  cloud  server  to 
generate a proof of data storage correctness, while VerifyProof is 
run by the TPA to audit the proof from the cloud server.
Our public  auditing system can be constructed from the above 
auditing scheme in two phases,
Setup and Audit:
– Setup: The user initializes the public and secret parameters of  
the system by executing KeyGen, and pre-processes the data file F 
by using SigGen to generate  the verification  metadata.  The user  then 
stores  the  data  file  F  at  the  cloud  server,  deletes  its  local  copy,  and 
publishes the verification metadata to TPA for later audit. As part of pre-
processing, the user may alter the data file F by expanding it or including 
additional metadata to be stored at server.
–  Audit:  The TPA issues an audit  message  or  challenge  to  the cloud 
server  to  make sure that the cloud server  has  retained the data file  F 
properly at the time of the audit. The cloud server will derive a response 
message from a function of the stored data file F by executing GenProof.  
Using the verification metadata, the TPA verifies the response via Verify 
Proof. Note that in our design, we do not assume any additional property 
on the data file, and thus regard error correcting codes as orthogonal to 
our system. If the user wants to have more error resiliency, he/she can 
first redundantly encode the data file and then provide us with the data 
file that has error-correcting codes integrated.
A) Mechanism Design Framework
We propose to apply problem transformation for mechanism design. The 
general  framework  is adopted from a generic  approach [9],  while  our 
instantiation is  completely different  and novel.  In  this  framework,  the 
process on cloud server can be represented by algorithm Proof Gen and 
the process on customer can be organized into three algorithms (KeyGen,  
ProbEnc, ResultDec). 
These four  algorithms are  summarized  below and will  be  instantiated 
later.
•  KeyGen(1k)  → {K}.  This is a randomized key generation algorithm 
which takes a system security parameter k, and returns a secret key K that 
is used later by customer to encrypt the target LP problem.
• ProbEnc(K,_) → {_K}. This algorithm encrypts the input tuple  into K 
with  the  secret  key  K.  According  to  problem  transformation,  the 
encrypted input K and thus defines the problem to be
solved in the cloud.
•  ProofGen(_K)  → {(y,  �)}.  This algorithm augments a generic solver 
that solves the problem  K to produce both the output y and a proof . The 
output y later decrypts to x, and � is used later by the customer to verify 
the correctness of y or x.
•  ResultDec(K,_, y,  �)  → {x, }⊥ .  This algorithm may choose to verify 
either y or x via the proof. In any case, a correct output x is produced by 
decrypting y using the secret K. 
The  algorithm outputs when  the  validation  fails,  indicating  the  cloud 
server  was  not  performing  the  computation  faithfully.  Note  that  our 
proposed mechanism provides us one-time pad
types of flexibility. Namely, we shall never use the same secret key K to 
two different problems. Thus, when analyzing the security strength of the 
mechanism, we focus on the cipher text only attack. We do not consider 
known plaintext attack in this paper but do allow adversaries to do
offline guessing or inferring via various problem-dependent information 
including sizes and signs of the solution, which are not necessary to be 
confidential.
B) Basic Techniques
Before presenting the details of our proposed mechanism, we study in 
this subsection a few basic techniques and show that the input encryption 
based  on  these  techniques  along  may  result  in  an  unsatisfactory 
mechanism. However, the analysis will give insights on how a stronger 
mechanism should be designed. Note that to simplify the presentation, we 
assume  that  the  cloud  server  honestly  performs  the  computation,  and 
defer the discussion on soundness to a later section.
1) Hiding equality constraints (A, b): First of all, a randomly generated m 
× m non-singular matrix Q can be part of the secret key K. The customer 
can  apply  the  matrix  to  Eq.  (2)  for  the  following  constraints 
transformation, Ax = b  ⇒A′x = b′ where A′ = QA and b′ = Qb.
Since we have assumed that A has full row rank, A′ must have full 
row  rank.  Without  knowing  Q,  it  is  not  possible  for  one  to 
determine the exact elements of A. However, the Null spaces of A 
and  A′  remains  the  same,  which  may  violate  the  security 
requirement of some applications. The vector b is encrypted in a 
perfect way since it can be mapped to an arbitrary b′ with a proper 
choice of Q.
2)  Hiding  inequality  constraints  (B):  The  customer  cannot 
transform the inequality constraints in the similar way as used for  
the equality constraints. This is because for an arbitrary invertible 
matrix Q, Bx ≥ 0 is not equivalent to QBx ≥ 0 in general.
To hide B, we can leverage the fact that a feasible solution to Eq.  
(2) must satisfy the equality constraints. To be more specific, the 
feasible regions defined by the following two
groups of constraints are the same.
Ax = b
Bx ≥ 0
Ax = b
(B − _A)x = B′x ≥ 0
where A  is a randomly generated n×m matrix in K satisfying that 
|B′|  =  |B  −  _A| 6= 0 and _b = 0. Since the condition b = 0 is 
largely underdetermined, it leaves great flexibility to choose _ in 
order to satisfy the above conditions.
3) Hiding objective functions c and value cT x: Given the widely 
application  of  LP,  such  as  the  estimation  of  business  annul 
revenues  or  personal  portfolio  holdings  etc.,  the  information 
contained in objective function c and optimal objective value cT x 
might  be  as  sensitive  as  the  constraints  of  A,B,  b.  Thus,  they 
should be protected, too.
To  achieve  this,  we  apply  constant  scaling  to  the  objective 
function, i.e. a real positive scalar is generated randomly as part of 
encryption key K and c is replaced by c. It is not possible to derive 
the original optimal objective value cT x without knowing first, 
since it can be mapped to any value with the same sign. While  
hiding the objective value well, this approach does leak structure-
wise information of objective function c. namely; the number and 
position of zero-elements in c are not protected. Besides, the ratio 
between  the  elements  in  c  are  also  preserved  after  constant  
scaling.
Summarization  of  basic  techniques  Overall,  the  basic 
techniques would choose a secret key K = (Q) and encrypt  the 
input tuple into K = (A′,B′, b′, c), which gives reasonable strength 
of problem input hiding. Also, these techniques are clearly correct 
in the sense that solving K would give the same optimal solution 
as solving. However, it also implies that although input privacy is 
achieved,  there  is  no  output  privacy.  Essentially,  it  shows  that 
although one can change the constraints to a completely different 
form,  it  is  not  necessary  the  feasible  region  defined  by  the 
constraints  will  change,  and  the  adversary  can  leverage  such 
information  to  gain  knowledge  of  the  original  LP  problem. 
Therefore,  any secure  linear  programming  mechanism must  be 
able to not only encrypt  the constraints but also to encrypt  the 
feasible region defined by the constraints.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
4.1 Security proof
We  evaluate  the  security  of  the  proposed  scheme  by  analyzing  its 
fulfillment of the security guarantee described in Section 2, namely, the 
storage correctness and privacy-preserving. We start from the single user 
case, where our main result is originated. Then we show how to extend  
the, security guarantee to a multi-user setting, where batch auditing for 
TPA is enabled. All proofs are derived on the probabilistic base, i.e., with 
high  probability  assurance,  which  we  omit  writing  explicitly.  Storage 
Correctness Guarantee We need to prove that the cloud server can not 
generate valid response toward TPA without faithfully storing the data, 
as captured by Theorem1.
Theorem 1.  If  the  cloud  server  passes  the  Audit  phase,  then  it  must 
indeed possess the specified
data intact as it is.
Proof (Proof Sketch). The proof consists of three steps. First, we show 
that there exists no ma-licious server that can forge a valid response {_, 
μ,R} to pass the verification equation 1. The correctness of this statement 
follows from the Theorem 4.2 proposed in [11]. Note that the value R in 
our protocol,  which  enables the privacy-preserving guarantee,  will  not 
affect  the  validity  of  the  equation,  due  to  the  circular  relationship 
between R and  in  = h(R) and the verification equation. Next, we show 
that if the response  {_, μ,R}  is valid, where μ = μ′  + r and  = h(R) = 
h(e(u,  v)r),  then the underlying  μ′  must  be valid  too.  Indeed,  we  can 
extract μ′ from the protocol in the random oracle model. Finally, similar 
to  the  argument  in  [11],  we  show that  the  validity  of  μ′  implies  the 
correctness of  {mi}i∈I where μ′  =  Pi∈I _imi. Here we utilize the small 
exponent (SE) test technique of batch verification in [21]. Because {_i} 
are picked up randomly by the TPA in each Audit phase,  {_i}  can be 
viewed similarly as the random chosen exponents in the SE test  [21]. 
Therefore, the correctness of individual sampled blocks is ensured. All 
above sums up to the storage correctness guarantee. Privacy Preserving 
Guarantee We want  to make sure that TPA can not derive users’ data 
content from the information collected during auditing process. This is 
equivalent  to prove the Theorem 2.  Note that if  μ′  can be derived by 
TPA, then  {mi}i∈I can be easily obtained by solving a group of linear 
equations when enough combinations of the same blocks are collected. 
Theorem 2. From the server’s response {_, μ,R}, TPA cannot recover μ′.
Proof  (Proof Sketch).  Again,  we  argue in  three steps.  First,  recall  the 
relationship  between  μ′  and  μ′,  which  requires  solving  discrete-log 
problems.
Second, we consider how to learn μ′ from μ. Note that μ is blinded by r as 
μ = μ′ + r and R = e(u, v)r, where r is chosen randomly by cloud server 
and is unknown to TPA. Even with R, due to the hardness of discrete-log 
assumption, the value r is still hidden against TPA. Thus, privacy of μ ′ is 
guaranteed from μ.
Finally, all that remains is to prove from {_, μ,R}, still no information on 
μ′ can be obtained by TPA. Recall that r is a random private value chosen 
by the server and μ = μ′  +r, where  = h(e(u, v)r).  Following the same 
technique of Schnorr signature, our auditing protocol between TPA and 
cloud server can be regarded as a provably secure honest zero knowledge 
identification scheme, by viewing μ′  as a secret key and  as a challenge 
value, which implies no information
on μ′  can be leaked. Indeed, it is easy to simulate valid response {μ,R} 
without knowing μ′ in the random oracle model. This completes the proof 
of Theorem 2.
Security  Guarantee  for  Batch  Auditing  Now  we  show  that 
extending our main result to a multi-user setting will not affect the 
aforementioned security insurance, as shown in Theorem 3:
Theorem 3. Our batch auditing protocol achieves the same storage 
correctness and privacy pre- serving guarantee as in the single-
user case. 
Proof  (Proof  Sketch).  We  only  prove  the  storage  correctness 
guarantee,  as the privacy-preserving guarantee in the multi-user 
setting is similar to that of Theorem 2, and thus omitted here. The
proposed  batch  auditing  protocol  is  built  upon  the  aggregate 
signature scheme proposed in [15].
According to the security strength of aggregate signature [15], in 
our multi-user setting, there exists no malicious cloud servers that 
can  forge  valid  μ1,  .  .  .  ,  μk  in  the  responses  to  pass  the 
verification  equation 2.  Actually,  the equation 2 functions  as  a 
kind of screening test as proposed.
While the screening test may not guarantee the validity of each 
individual _k, it does ensure the authenticity of μk in the batch 
auditing protocol, which is adequate for the rationale in our case.
Once the validity of μ1, . . . , μk is guaranteed, from the proof of 
Theorem 1,  the storage  correctness  guarantee  in  the multi-user 
setting is achieved.
4.2 Performance Analysis
We  now  assess  the  performance  of  the  proposed  privacy-
preserving public auditing scheme. We will focus on the extra cost 
introduced by the privacy-preserving guarantee and the efficiency 
of  the  proposed  batch  auditing  technique.  The  experiment  is 
conducted  using  C  on  a  Linux  system  with  an  Intel  Core  2 
processor running at  1.86 GHz, 2048MB of RAM, and a 7200 
RPM Western Digital  250 GB Serial ATA drive with an 8 MB 
buffer.  Algorithms  use  the  Pairing-Based  Cryptography  (PBC) 
library version 0.4.18. The elliptic curve utilized in the experiment 
is  a  MNT  curve,  with  base  field  size  of  159  bits  and  the 
embedding degree 6.  The security level is chosen to be 80 bit, 
which  means  |i|  =  80  and  |p|  =  160.  All  experimental  results 
represent the mean of 20 trials.
Cost of Privacy-preserving Guarantee We begin by estimating the 
cost  in  terms  of  basic  cryptographic  operations,  as  notated  in 
Table 1. Suppose there are c random blocks specified in the chal 
during the Audit phase. Under this setting, we quantify the extra 
cost introduced by the support of privacy-preserving into server 
computation,  auditor  computation  as  well  as  communication 
overhead. On the server side, the generated response includes an 
aggregated signature A = Qi*I I i ,G1, a random metadata R = e(u, 
v)r  ∈GT , and a blinded linear combination of sampled blocks μ = 
Pi∈I  _imi  +r   ∈ Zp,  where   =  h(R)   ∈ Zp.  The  corresponding 
computation cost is c-MultExp1
G1(|_i|), Exp1
GT (|p|), and Hash1
Zp + Addc
Zp + Multc+1
Zp , respectively. 
Compared  to  the  existing  homomorphic  authenticator  based 
solution  for  ensuring  remote  data  integrity,  the  extra  cost  for 
protecting the user privacy, resulted from the random mask R, is 
only a constant:
Exp1
GT (|p|) + Mult1
Zp + Hash1
Zp + Add1
Zp , which has nothing to do with the number of sampled
blocks c. When c is set to be 460 or 300 for high assurance of auditing, as  
discussed in Section 3.3, the extra cost for privacy-preserving guarantee 
on  the  server  side  would  be  negligible  against  the  total  server 
computation for response generation.
Similarly, on the auditor side, upon receiving the response {_,R, μ}, the 
corresponding computation cost for response validation is Hash1
Zp+c-MultExp1
G1(|_i|)+Hashc
G1+Mult1
G1+Mult1
GT +
Exp3
G1 (|p|) + Pair2
G1,G2 , among which only Hash1
Zp + Exp2
G1(|p|) + Mult1
GT account for the additional constant computation cost. For c = 460 or 
300,  and  considering  the  relatively  expensive  pairing  operations,  this 
extra  cost  imposes  little  overhead  on  the  overall  cost  of  response 
validation, and thus can be ignored. For the sake of completeness, Table 
2 gives the experiment result on performance comparison between our 
scheme and the state-of-the-art. It can be shown that the performance of 
our  scheme  is  almost  the  same  as  that  of  [11],  even  if  our  scheme 
supports privacy-preserving guarantee while [11] does not. Note that in 
our scheme, the server’s response {,R, μ} contains an additional random 
element R, which is a group element of GT and has the size close to 960 
bits. This explains the extra communication cost of our scheme opposing.
Batch Auditing Efficiency Discussion in Section 3.4 gives an asymptotic 
efficiency  analysis  on  the  batch  auditing,  by  considering  only  total 
number of expensive pairing operations. However, on the practical side, 
there  are  additional operations required for  batching,  such as modular  
exponentiations and multiplications. Meanwhile,  the different  sampling 
strategies, i.e., different numbers.
5. RELATED WORK
General secure computation outsourcing that fulfills all aforementioned 
requirements,  such  as  input/output  privacy  and  correctness/soundness 
guarantee  has  been  shown  feasible  in  theory  by  Gennaro  et  al.  [9].  
However,  it  is  currently  not  practical  due  to  its  huge  computation 
complexity.  Instead  of  outsourcing  general  functions,  in  the  security 
community,  Atallah et  al.  explore a list of work [5],  [7],  [8],  [10] for  
securely outsourcing specific applications. The customized solutions are 
expected to be more efficient than the general way of constructing the 
circuits. In [5], they give the first investigation of secure outsourcing of 
numerical  and  scientific  computation.  A  set  of  problem  dependent 
disguising techniques are  proposed for  different  scientific  applications 
like linear algebra, sorting, string pattern matching, etc. However,
these  disguise  techniques  explicitly  allow  information  disclosure  to 
certain degree. Besides, they do not handle the important case of result  
verification, which in our work is bundled into the design and comes at 
close-to-zero additional cost. Later on in [7] and [8], Atallah et al. give 
two protocol designs for both secure sequence comparison outsourcing 
and secure algebraic computation outsourcing. However, both protocols 
use  heavy  cryptographic  primitive  such  as  homomorphic  encryptions 
and/or oblivious transfer and do not scale well for large problem set. In  
addition,  both  designs  are  built  upon  the  assumption  of  two  non-
colluding servers and thus vulnerable to colluding attacks. Based 
on the same assumption, Hohenberger et al. [6] provide protocols 
for  secure  outsourcing  of  modular  exponentiation,  which  is 
considered  as  prohibitively  expensive  in  most  public-key 
cryptography operations. Very recently, Atallah [10] et al. give a 
provably  secure  protocol  for  secure  outsourcing  matrix 
multiplications  based  on  secret  sharing  While  this  work 
outperforms their previous work [8] in the sense of single server 
assumption  and  computation  efficiency  (no  expensive 
cryptographic  primitives),  the  drawback  is  the  large 
communication  overhead.  Namely,  due  to  secret  sharing 
technique, all  scalar operations in original matrix multiplication 
are expanded to polynomials,  introducing significant  amount  of 
overhead. 
Considering the case of the result verification, the communication 
overhead  must  be  further  doubled,  due  to  the  introducing  of 
additional pre-computed “random noise” matrices.
In short,  these solutions, although elegant, are still not efficient 
enough for immediate practical uses, which we aim to address for 
the  secure  LP  outsourcing  in  this  paper.  B.  Work  on  Secure 
Multiparty Computation Another large existing list of work that 
relates to (but is also significantly different from) ours is Secure 
Multi-party Computation (SMC), first introduced by Yao [11] and 
later extended by Goldreich and many others. SMC allows two or 
more  parties  to  jointly  compute  some  general  function  while 
hiding their inputs to each other.  As general  SMC can be very 
inefficient,  Du  and  Atallah  et.  al.  have  proposed  a  series  of 
customized  solutions  under  the  SMC context  to  a  spectrum of 
special  computation  problems,  such  as  privacy-preserving 
cooperative statistical analysis, scientific computation, geometric 
computations,  sequence  comparisons,  etc.  However,  directly 
applying  these  approaches  to  the  cloud  computing  model  for 
secure computation outsourcing would still be problematic. The 
major reason is that they did not address the asymmetry among 
the computational powers possessed by cloud and the customers, 
i.e.,  all  these  schemes  in  the  context  of  SMC  impose  each 
involved  parties  comparable  computation  burdens,  which  we 
specifically avoid in the mechanism design by shifting as much as 
possible computation burden to cloud only. Another reason is the 
asymmetric  security  requirement.  In  SMC  no  single  involved 
party  knows  all  the  problem  input  information,  making  result 
verification  a  very  difficult  task.  But  in  our  model,  we  can 
explicitly  exploit  the  fact  that  the  customer  knows  all  input 
information  and  thus  design  efficient  result  verification 
mechanism. 
Recently, Li and Atallah give a study for secure and collaborative 
computation of linear programming under the SMC framework. 
Their  solution  is  based  on  the  additive  split  of  the  constraint 
matrix  between  two  involved  parties,  followed  by  a  series  of 
interactive  (and  arguably  heavy)  cryptographic  protocols 
collaboratively  executed  in  each  iteration  step  of  the  Simplex 
Algorithm.  This  solution has the computation  asymmetry  issue 
mentioned  previously.  Besides,  they  only  consider  honest-but-
curious model and thus do not guarantee that the final solution is 
optimal.
A. Work  on  Delegating  Computation  and  Cheating 
Detection
Detecting the unfaithful behaviors for computation outsourcing is 
not  an  easy  task,  even  without  consideration  of  input/output 
privacy.  Verifiable  computation  delegation,  where  a  computationally 
weak customer can verify the correctness of the delegated computation 
results from a powerful but untrusted server without investing too much 
resources,  has  found  great  interests  in  theoretical  computer  science 
community. Some recent general result can be found in Goldwasser et al.. 
In  distributed  computing  and  targeting  the  specific  computation 
delegation of one-way function inversion, Golle et al propose to insert  
some  pre-computed  results  (images  of  “ringers”)  along  with  the 
computation workload to defeat untrusted (or lazy) workers.  Du. et al. 
propose  a  method  of  cheating  detection  for  general  computation 
outsourcing  in  grid  computing.  The  server  is  required  to  provide  a 
commitment via a Merkle tree based on the results it computed.
The customer can then use the commitment combined with a sampling 
approach to carry out the result verification (without re-doing much of 
the outsourced work.). However, all above schemes allow server actually 
see the data and result it is computing with, which is strictly prohibited
in the cloud computing model  for  data privacy.  Thus,  the problem of 
result  verification  essentially  becomes  more  difficult,  when  both 
input/output privacy is demanded. Our work leverages the duality theory 
of LP problem and effectively bundles the result verification within the 
mechanism design, with little extra overhead on both customer and cloud 
server.
Fig 3: Comparison on auditing time between batch auditing and 
individual auditing. Per task auditing time denotes the total auditing time 
divided by the number of tasks. For clarity reasons, we omit the straight 
curve for individual auditing when c=300.
Fig  4:  Comparison  on  auditing  time  between  batch  auditing  and 
individual  auditing,  when  α-fraction of 256 responses are  invalid.  Per 
task auditing time denotes the total auditing time divided by the number 
of tasks.
of sampled blocks c, is also a variable factor that affects  the batching  
efficiency. Thus, whether the benefits of removing pairings significantly 
outweighs these additional operations is remained to be verified. To get a 
complete view of batching efficiency, we conduct a similar timed batch 
auditing test as , where the number of auditing tasks is increased from 1 
to  approximately  200  with  intervals  of  8.  The  performance  of  the 
corresponding non-batched (individual) auditing is provided as a baseline 
for the measurement. Following the same experimental setting as c = 460 
and 300, the average per task auditing time for both batch auditing 
and the individual auditing is shown in Fig. 2, where the per task 
auditing time is computed by dividing total auditing time by the 
number  of  tasks.  It  can  be  shown  that  compared  to  individual 
auditing,  batch  auditing  indeed  helps  reduce  the  TPA’s 
computation cost, as more than 11% and 14% of per-task auditing 
time is saved, when c is set to be 460 and 300, respectively.
Sorting out Invalid Responses Now we use experiment to justify 
the efficiency of our recursive binary search approach for TPA to 
sort out the invalid responses when batch auditing fails, as Note 
that  this  experiment  is  tightly  pertained  to  works  by  [11,  13] 
which evaluates the batch verification efficiency of various short 
signature schemes.
To  evaluate  the  feasibility  of  the  recursive  approach,  we  first 
generate  a collection of 256 valid  responses,  which implies  the 
TPA may concurrently handle 256 different auditing delegations.
We then conduct the tests repeatedly while randomly corrupting 
an   fraction,  ranging  from 0  to  18%,  by  replacing  them with 
random values.  The  average  auditing  time  per  task  against  the 
individual  auditing  approach  is  presented  in  Fig.  3.  The  result 
shows that even the number of invalid responses exceeds 15% of 
the total batch size, the performance of batch auditing can still be  
safely  concluded  as  more  preferable  than  the  straightforward 
individual auditing. 
Note that this is consistent with the experiment results derived.
6. CONCLUSION
In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  privacy-preserving  public  auditing 
system for data storage security in Cloud Computing, where TPA 
can  perform  the  storage  auditing  without  demanding  the  local 
copy  of  data.  We  utilize  the  homomorphic  authenticator  and 
random mask technique to guarantee that TPA would not learn 
any knowledge about the data content stored on the cloud server  
during the efficient auditing process,  which not only eliminates 
the burden of cloud user from the tedious and possibly expensive 
auditing task, but also alleviates the users’ fear of their outsourced 
data leakage along with the problem of securely outsourcing LP 
computations  in  cloud computing,  and provide  such a  practical 
mechanism design  which  fulfills  input/output  privacy,  cheating 
resilience,  and  efficiency.  By  explicitly  decomposing  LP 
computation outsourcing into public LP solvers and private data, 
our  mechanism  design  is  able  to  explore  appropriate 
security/efficiency tradeoffs via higher level LP computation than 
the general circuit Representation.
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